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Logical knowledge is comparable to a finger which points to the object and disappears when the object is seen. True knowledge is awareness, a perception of the identity with the supreme, a clear-sighted intuition. (1939, p. 24) It is both remarkable and significant that someone as well acquainted with the original sources as Radhakrishnan should propound such a view of Indian thought. For, as I will show, the existence of strong rational, logical, and empiricist trends in Indian thought was well known both to nineteenth-century European logicians (as well as to orientalists) and historians of logic. The position of those who, like Radhakrishnan and Price, see in Indian philosophy a radically non-European mode of thought depends therefore on a deliberate choice: one involves the exclusion of texts dealing with the canons of sound argument, or with the criteria governing rational assent, or with grammar and the philosophy of language; and the other involves the promotion of quasi-religious, soteriological texts whose theme is the introspective methodology underlying what was called 'the science of the soul' (atmavidya). As Inden, in his recent book Imagining India, wryly observes, "To get us to this point (the point at which the Upanisads and Vedantic texts are seen as containing the essentials of Indian philosophy) our guides have already had to make some careful selections" (1990, p. 101).
I believe that these selections were, to a great extent, a product of the colonized Indian intellectual struggle for an indigenous, non-European, identity. The devaluation of rationalist elements in Indian philosophical thought arose because of 'nativist' trends in the Indian nationalist movement, attempts to find in India's past something radically non-European with which to confront the colonial intrusion. What they found was a Vedantic system grounded in certain 'fundamental' Upanisadic texts. T. Raychaudhuri, in his study of nineteenth-century Bengali attitudes, makes the following observation:
The emerging nationalist consciousness adopted the heritage of the Hindu culture as the focus of its identity and glorified in the Hindu past.... Even the secular-agnostic trend in Bengali middle class culture, traceable back to the early days of the Hindu College-if not to the even older tradition of Navyanyaya-was subsumed by the ill-defined sense of national identity built around the Hindu heritage and its social body. A selective veneration for elements of the Hindu culture was thus the cultural bed-rock of the nationalist awareness. (1988, p. 3, my italics) It is important to stress that this process involved an act of deliberate choice. The spiritual, Vedantic, past was not there for the taking, but had to be constructed and imposed through a selective promulgation of key texts. Two remarkable passages from the Bengali social reformer Vivekananda throw much light on the mechanisms through which this took Philosophy East & West place. In the first, he is addressing a Bengali disciple: The second passage is from a speech in Madras:
Transported from the soil of Mithila to Navadvipa, nurtured and developed by the fostering genius of Shiromani, Gadadhara and Jadadisha, and a host of other great names, an analysis of the laws of reasoning in some points superior to every other system in the whole world, expressed in a wonderful and precise mosaic of language, stands the Nyaya of Bengal, respected and studied throughout the length and breadth of Hindusthan. But, alas, the Vedic study was sadly neglected, and until within the last few years, scarcely anyone could be found in Bengal to teach the Mahabhashya of Patanjali. Vivekananda here gives us a glimpse, albeit idiosyncratic, into the academic life of nineteenth-century Bengal. It was a place where logic, grammar, and also Tantrism were the principal intellectual activities. But for Vivekananda, as later for Radhakrishnan, the study of logic was of no help in the spiritual renaissance that would rejuvenate India. It was necessary, rather, to establish institutions in which the key texts of Vedanta-the Upanisads and Brahma-sutras-could be taught. The neoHindu movement did not, therefore, involve a "return to the source," as some have argued,' if by this is meant the rediscovery of a 'native' culture. It needed, rather, to replace one set of sources with another, and to create a new, Vedantic, culture, which would usurp an already existing intellectual culture grounded in India's logical and grammatical traditions. If, long before the time of H. H. Price, any awareness of these traditions had disappeared, apart from within specialist academic circles, it reflects the effectiveness with which 'neo-Hindu' thinkers like Vivekananda, Radhakrishnan, and many others, had managed to impose their own vision of India's philosophical past.
II
Since its origins were largely in the Indian nationalist struggle, the which they discuss the Hindu syllogism. Indeed, if Blakey's remark is anything to go on, it had become virtually de rigueur to discuss the Hindu syllogism in any account of the history of logic. As already noted, behind this lay a fascination with the question of Greek-Indian influence and, in particular, whether the basic idea of syllogistic argument schemas had been transmitted either from Greece to India or from India to Greece.
The general impression is that a certain knowledge of Indian logical theory was 'in the air' in the mid-nineteenth century, and that it was considered to be a topic worthy of serious, even if critical, discussion.
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Note, however, that Blakey's grudging inclusion of such Eastern "systems of logic" into his history is dictated not by a willingness to admit that there is anything of value to be found in them, but rather out of deference to fashion. He continues:
I have a great doubt of such logical views becoming of any value whatever in the cause of general knowledge or science, or of ever having any fair claim to be admitted as an integral part of the Catholic philosophy of mankind. It is absurd to conceive that a logic can be of any value from a people who have not a single sound philosophical principle, nor any intellectual power whatever to work out a problem connected with human nature, in a manner that is at all rational or intelligent. Reasoning, at least in the higher forms of it among such semi-barbarous nations, must be at its lowest ebb; nor does there seem to be any intellectual stamina, in such races of men, to impart to it more vigour and rationality. One point alone appears certain, and that is, that they [the Nyaya] can lay but slight claims to accuracy of exposition. This is proved clearly enough by the form of their syllogism, which is made to consist of five instead of three parts. Two of these are manifestly superfluous, while by the introduction of an example in the third the universality of the conclusion is vitiated. (p. 365) Irritated probably by the haphazard ordering of the sections in such an ancient and diachronic text as the Nyaya-sutra, he grumbles that "in its exposition the Nyaya is tedious, loose and unmethodical. Indeed the whole form of this philosophy is a proof of the incapacity of its expositors to enter into the intrinsic development of ideas, whatever knowledge they may have possessed of the external laws of composition" (p. 366). Ritter's sources, we may note, are Colebrooke (he cites the passage above in a footnote) and Windischmann, whose view he reports thus: "Windischmann concludes that the Hindoos possessed only the fundamental principles of the logic which the Greeks cultivated" (p. 366).
Ritter's comments are representative of European reactions to the Hindu syllogism in the nineteenth century. The Indian version of the syllogism is found wanting in two respects. First, of the five steps, two are "manifestly superfluous." For in a properly formulated syllogism, the conclusion, that the hill is fiery, follows from two premises: a minor premise, that the hill is smoky, and a major premise, that whatever has smoke also has fire. When they are construed as setting out the premises and conclusion of a deductive argument, the Indian schema indeed looks as if it is "nothing but an operose repetition of the same reasoning" Jonardon Ganeri Philosophy East & West (Hamilton 1852), in which the conclusion is first stated followed by the premises, and again the premises stated followed by the conclusion.
Apologists for the Nyaya were quick to point out that this criticism depends on a radical misconstrual of the point of the five-step format, whose function, they said, is not to present the premises and conclusion of a formal deduction, but to describe the correct form for conducting a debate. It is to be thought of as a sort of question-and-answer session, with one side advancing a thesis, and the other interrogating him or her. As Ballantyne put it in his lengthy reply to Hamilton, "the five-membered exposition [is not] the Hindu syllogism at all, but the Hindu rhetorical exposition" (1859, p. 149). If the five-step format is understood as a stylized representation of the stages in a rhetorical debate, then it exhibits "a more natural mode of reasoning than is compatible with the compressed limits of the syllogism" (V. Kennedy 1839). The presence of five, rather than three, steps is natural, they suggest, when we recall that each step is a response to a silent interlocutor: Nevertheless, the impression remained that the Indian analysis of the reasoning process was clumsy and imprecise, and that the Indian philosophers were unable, with any accuracy, to articulate the essentials of a properly formulated argument (cf. Blakey 1851, p. 385).
The citation of an example in the third step only served to reinforce this impression, and to encourage those critics for whom Indian rational processes never moved beyond the level of the analogical. The exact meaning of Ritter's assertion, that the introduction of an example vitiates the universality of the conclusion, is not entirely clear, but apparently implies that the inference proceeds from particular to particular without the intervention of such a generalization as would be expressed by the major premise in a syllogism. Keith was later to claim that "the fact that reasoning can only proceed by means of a general proposition had not yet been appreciated in the [Nyaya] school, for this reasoning still was from particular to particular by analogy" (1924, p. 87). Others objected that the example was simply superfluous: the evaluation of an argument as valid or invalid in no way depends on the citation of an instance of the major premise.
Once again, authors like Ballantyne, Muller, and Roer strove to show that the citation of an example had a legitimate point. Ballantyne relied once more on the distinction between logic and rhetoric, claiming that the example helped to convince one's dialectical opponent of the truth of the general rule. For Muller, the function of the example was to indicate what he called the 'modality' of the general rule. He noted that Indian logicians distinguish between three kinds of such rule: those whose antecedent holds over the whole domain ("Whatever is nameable is knowable"), those whose antecedent holds over only part of the domain ("Whatever has smoke has fire"), and those whose antecedent holds over none of the domain ("Anything except earth which is different from the elements other than earth has odour").4 According to Muller, the example indicates which kind of rule is being employed in the third step.
Roer took yet another tack. Relying on the distinction between valid and sound inference, he argued that "the Nyaya wanted not only to give rules for the correctness of the logical operation, but to guard against false premises" (1850, p. xxiii). Citing an example could then be seen as a gesture in the direction of an inductive confirmation of the major premise, upon whose truth the soundness of the inference rests.
For my present purpose, to reconstruct European perceptions of Indian rationalist thought, it is unnecessary to evaluate the relative merits of these hypothetical justifications of the inclusion of an example. I would like instead to point out an irony here. Of all the philosophers of the nineteenth century, J. S. Mill was one of the most influential. He became famous, in particular, for his critique of syllogistic reasoning, namely that, since the major premise "all men are mortal" already 'includes' the conclusion "Socrates is mortal," the premises of a syllogism already assert what they are supposed to prove. The real grounds for the inference, he claimed, were just the observed instances on which our belief in the major premise rests, and therefore the inference is from particular to particular, in which, as he puts it, the major premise is just a "memorandum" of previously observed instances. Mill's doctrine seemed to the Western expositors of Nyaya to be very similar to the Indian pattern of inference, with its emphasis on citing examples, and they constantly referred to his theory in their expositions. The irony is that Mill, though he worked as an Indian colonial administrator for most of his life, regarded Indian thought as undeveloped, and must have found unsettling the suggestion that there were resonances in it of his own ideas. It is a striking fact that Mill never once refers to the Indian syllogism or to the Indian rationalist schools, though he was certainly acquainted with the orientalists, like Ballantyne, who promoted them.
Still another way in which the Nyaya argument pattern fails to be properly syllogistic was noted by V. Kennedy: The slightly obscure point to which V. Kennedy draws attention is that the middle term in an Aristotelian syllogism is, in effect, a variable. In other words, we can represent the syllogistic schema as having the following form: if there is some property H such that whatever has F has H, and whatever has H has G, then whatever has F has G. On the other hand, V. Kennedy claims, the 'reason-property' (hetu) in the Nyaya argument is something explicitly mentioned and known to be possessed by the subject. Unfortunately, this line of thought is based on poor acquaintance with the texts, for, as S. Bhattacharyya has shown in his paper on the middle term (Bhattacharyya 1968 Here, then, was an explanation of the Indian thinkers' alleged failure to develop a properly scientific conception of philosophy. Though they stumbled across the patterns of syllogistic reasoning, their traditionalist habits of mind stopped them from turning it into the basis of a methodical system of logic. "The foundation of logic as a science," says Ueberweg, "is a work of the Greek mind, which equally removed from the hardness of the Northern and the softness of the Oriental, harmoniously united power and impressibility" ([1857] 1871). Even Roer, whose analysis of the Nyaya was one of the most sophisticated of the time, subscribed to a version of this myth:
That Hindu philosophy will have any great influence on the development of European philosophy and mediately of European civilization must be denied. You are compelled to think by reading the works of the Greeks, they introduce you into the process of their thoughts, and by this force you to accompany them with your own thoughts, until you arrive as it were by your own mind at the principles of their systems.... The Hindus, on the other hand, are dogmatical. They commence synthetically with a statement of their principles, yet do not condescend to unfold the train of thought which has led them (1850, pp. iv-v).
This "inherent fault" in the mode of exposition of the Indians' philosophical texts "perhaps, more than anything else, contributed to the narrow limits of their mental horizon."
The picture, then, was of Indian rationalist thought as moribund, and in particular of the Indian syllogism as a clumsy, barnacled version of its proper, Aristotelian form. This picture lay behind the endeavors of even those orientalists like Ballantyne who thought they could perceive in the Nyaya system the beginnings of a scientific conception of philosophy. As head of the Sanskrit College in Benares, Ballantyne inherited from another Scottish orientalist, Muir, the program of educating intelligent brahmins by translating Christian and Western philosophical texts into Sanskrit. The students at this college were looked upon to disperse European ideas among their countrymen by "inculcating the mass with the knowledge of the West," as Ballantyne put it. Ballantyne's educational approach was based on what later came to be called the concept of 'fulfillment'-the idea that Indian religious and philosophical doctrines should not be directly refuted, but instead developed and improved until they resembled their European counterparts. "The method which I have found to answer best," says Ballantyne, "is to take as a starting point some established point in their own philosophy, and to show how the philosophers of Europe have followed up the enquiry" (1852, p. xi). To this end, Ballantyne composed in Sanskrit his Synopsis of Science, which, though deriving its arrangement and style from the Nyaya-sutras, was meant to be "a consistent digest of European knowledge for the use of India." Within this text, the treatment of inference acquired special importance, for "our modern conception of Induction being that to which is particularly to be attributed our superior progress in science, it appeared highly important ... that the Hindu speculations on the subject should be carefully investigated" (1852: xxvi).
Thus even Ballantyne, who was the first to produce good translations of Indian logical texts, and who defended the Nyaya system whenever he found it criticized (cf. 
